Bankruptcy Officials vs. The Internal Revenue Service: The Beat Goes On by Langstraat, Craig J. & Jackson, K. Dianne
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Tax Journal Akron Law Journals
1993
Bankruptcy Officials vs. The Internal Revenue
Service: The Beat Goes On
Craig J. Langstraat
K. Dianne Jackson
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Tax Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Langstraat, Craig J. and Jackson, K. Dianne (1993) "Bankruptcy Officials vs. The Internal Revenue Service: The
Beat Goes On," Akron Tax Journal: Vol. 10 , Article 6.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol10/iss1/6
BANKRUPTCY OFFICIALS VS. THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:






Over the last several years, the maximum collection tax policy of the federal gov-
ernment under the Internal Revenue Code has frequently clashed with the policy of a
fresh start for the bankruptcy debtor under the bankruptcy laws.' These conflicts have
resulted in several recent significant court cases, including two cases heard and decided
by the United States Supreme Court.2 Given the historical record of relatively few tax
cases being heard by the Supreme Court, the recent attention to bankruptcy related tax
cases demonstrates the importance and growing controversy in the subject area.
This author has previously addressed several areas of conflict between bankruptcy
officials; i.e., trustees and judges, and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").3 Due to
continued litigation, both in the U.S. Supreme Court and in certain federal courts of
appeal, some of these areas will be reevaluated in this article. In addition, new areas of
conflict resulting in litigation in various levels of the federal court system will be dis-
cussed. Policy and statutory modifications will be suggested to alleviate the growing
costly burden of litigation.
MULTIPLE CONFRONTATIONS
The areas of conflict between bankruptcy officials and the IRS are varied and
continually growing in number. Whenever a taxpayer becomes a debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the resolution of anytax matterinvolving the debtorbecomes entwined with
the resolution of the bankruptcy process. The following issues are representative of the
conflicts between tax policy and bankruptcy policy:
" Professor, School of Accountancy, Memphis State University; J.D., Arizona State University; LLM. (Taxation),
University of San Diego; C.P.A.; Member of Arizona and California Bars.
B.B.A. Texas Tech University; M.S. Memphis State University, C.PA.
See 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-1330 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993).
2 See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992). and United States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc.,
495 U.S. 545 (1990).
' See Craig J. Langstraat & Mark S. Aquadro. Bankruptcy Officials versus the Internal Revenue Service: A Federal
House Divided Against Itself, 8 AKRON TAX J. 131 (1991).111
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(1) Designation andAllocationofBankruptcyThxPaymenits-Supreme
Court decision UnitedStates v. Energy Resources Co., Inc.,4 and
its progeny.
(2) IRS SovereignImmunity- Supreme Courtdecision UnitedStates
Y. Nordic Village, Inc.' and later litigation.
(3) Availability of Qualified Plan Assets for Satisfaction of Tax
Debts-Supreme Court decision Patterson v. Shwrnate.6
(4) ConflictinStatutoryTermsbetweenThe InternalRevenue Code
and the Bankruptcy Code-Sixth Circuit decisionln reMansfield
ire & Rubber Co.7 and contrary Circuit Court opinions.
DESIGNATION AND ALLOCATION OF BANKRUPTCY TAX PAYMENTS
Background
Trust fund tax liabilities represent monies withheld by a business or collected by a
business which are required to be held as a special fund in trust for the benefit of the
federal government.' The most common trust fund tax liability is the withholding of
federal income tax from an employee's wages. The Intemal Revenue Code provides two
types of penalties in the event trust fund taxes ae not paid over to the federal government 9
Criminal fines and incarceration are possible consequences for any person who
willfully fails to pay over the trust fund taxes.'0 In addition, the government may hold
a responsible person; i.e., a corporate officer, personally liable for a penalty equal to
100% of the amount of tax withheld, but not paid to the government." This penalty is
4 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
- 112S.Q. 1011 (1992).
112 S.C. 2242 (1992).
' United States v. Mansfield Tre & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Te & Rubber Company, 942 E 2d 1055 (6th Cir.
1991)), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1165 (1992).
I.R.C. § 7501(a) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
SI.R.C. § 7501(b) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
10 I.R.C. § 7202 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
" I.R.C. § 6672(a) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
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generally applied to any person required by the Internal Revenue Code to collect, ac-
count for, and pay over any tax imposed by the Code. 2
The IRS has full discretion (at least under its own rules) to allocate "involuntary"
tax payments in a manner which will maximize the amount of assessed tax that may be
collected. ' 3 In the case ofa"voluntary" tax payment, the taxpayer is allowed to designate
the manner in which the payment will be allocated. 4 It is the policy of the IRS to
designate involuntary tax payments to non-trust fund taxes first and then to trust fund
taxes.'5 If there are inadequate payments from the corporation to cover both trust and
non-trust fund liabilities, this policy ensures that the IRS can obtain the maximum
collection possible by assessing the 100% penalty against the responsible persons for any
unpaid trust fund liabilities.
In a bankruptcy reorganization situation, a debtor corporation often desires to allo-
cate any tax payments made during bankruptcy to the trust fund taxes first. This approach
can be a benefit to both the debtor corporation and its responsible persons. The debtor
corporation is able to decrease its tax liability while protecting its officers or other
responsible persons whose services may be needed for a successful reorganization. The
responsible persons' primary liability for the 100% penalty under IRC § 6672 will be
reduced or eliminated.
The conflict in this area between the goals of the bankruptcy officials and those of
the IRS have generally focused on two issues: (1) whether a tax payment is voluntary
or involuntary and (2) whether the bankruptcy officials or courts have the authority to
allocate payments made to the IRS in a manner that is inconsistent with IRS policy.
Tax Payment Designation
The issue of tax payment designation between voluntary and involuntary in a Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy proceeding has been addressed by the First,'6Third,"7 Sixth, 8 Eighth,' 9
12 Id.
13 See Stuart K. Salchow, IRS Practice & Policy, 3A Tax MgMt. (BNA) 1080.B.6 (Mar. 1993). See also Muntwyler
v. United States, 703 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1983); Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83.
14 See Rev Ru1 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83. See also Wood v. United States, 808 F2d 411 (5th Cir. 1987); Muntwyler,
703 F.2d at 1030.
I See Salchow, supra note 13, at 1080.C.
26 See IRS v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., (In re Energy Resources Co., Inc.,), 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989), cert
granted, sub nor. United States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., 493 U.S. 963 (1989). aff'd, 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
'T In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987),
Dulhannes & Co., Inc. v. Michigan (In re DuCharmes & Co.), 852 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988).
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Ninth," and Tenth2 Circuits. These courts have held that tax payments in the context
of a Chapter 11 reorganization were involuntary. In a tax court decision, cited often in
cases involving bankruptcy proceedings, an involuntary payment was defined as "any
payment received by the IRS as a result of distraint or levy or from a legal proceeding
in which the United States is seeking to collect delinquenttaxes or file a claim therefor."
The Supreme Court selected the First Circuit case, IRS v. Energy Resources Co.,
Inc. ,23 to ultimately resolve the conflicts in this area. However, as discussed in more
detail below, the Court focused on the authority to allocate tax payments of bankrupt
estates rather than on the issue of the designation of such payments as voluntary or
involuntary. Thus, the circuit court decisions still control in the determination of invol-
untary versus voluntary status of tax payments in bankruptcy.
Tax Payment Allocations
In Energy Resources, the Supreme Court focused on the allocation of tax payments
by the bankruptcy court in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan which was in direct conflict
with IRS administrative policy. The Court found that a bankruptcy court does have the
authority under the Bankruptcy Code to allocate tax payments of the bankrupt estate, where
the court determines that such an allocation is necessary for the reorganization's succss34
This opinion was based on the bankruptcy court's authority to rearrange debtor-
creditor relationships in a title 11 case in order to give the debtor an opportunity to
rehabilitate with a "fresh start." The key language in the Bankruptcy Code relied on by
the Supreme Court are provisions which empower a bankruptcy court to approve "any
... appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,'2
and to "issue any order, process, orjudgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of [the Act]."25
Post-Energy Resources Litigation
While the Supreme Court decision in Energy Resources may have resolved the
controversy surrounding authority to allocate tax payments in a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
o United States v. Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc. (In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc.), 833 F.2d 797 (9th
Cir. 1987).
21 Fulmer v. United States (In re Fullmer), 962 F2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65,69 (1966
IRS v. Energy Resources Co., Inc. (Inre EnergyResources Co., Inc.), 871 F.2d 223 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. granted
sub nont. United States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., 493 U.S. 963 (1989), affd, 495 U.C. 545 (1990).
2' United States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 545,547-49 (1990).
11 U.S.C.S. § 1123(b)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
2 11 U.S.C.S. § 105 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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tion, several Circuit court opinions since EnergyResources have held that in bankruptcy
proceedings other than Chapter 11 reorganization, Energy Resources is not controlling.
In the case of In re Kare Kemical, Inc.,27 the Eleventh Circuit held that the Court's
reasons for allowing payment allocation in Chapter 11 reorganizations in Energy Re-
sources were not present in liquidation cases.2 Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not
have authority to approve the Chapter 11 liquidation plan of Kare Kemical which re-
quired the IRS to allocate tax payments to the principal portion of trust fund taxes first
and then to interest or penalties. Similarly, the Third Circuit held that in a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding, in the absence of a showing of need for a reorganization or
similar purpose, a bankruptcy court is not free to direct the allocation of tax payments
in contravention ofthe policy behind I.R.C. § 6672 and long-standing IRS procedures.29
Lowercourts are followingthe same line of reasoning as these Clct Courts in distinguishing
Energy Resources from bankruptcy proceedings that do not involve a reorganization.30
One bankruptcy court and the Ninth Circuit has allowed the allocation of tax pay-
ments in a Chapter 11 liquidating plan. 31 In, In re Deer Park, the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel held the fact that the bankruptcy plan in question was a liquidating plan under
Chapter 11 did not forego the applicability of the holding in Energy Resources.32 The
panel cited Bankruptcy Code §1129(a)(11) which provides that liquidation may be
contemplated in a valid Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, despite the label "reorgani-
zation. 33 The Panel concluded that the allocation of tax payments by the bankruptcy
court was necessary for the success of the liquidating plan as the services of a former
corporate officer were needed to complete the liquidation of the debtor's assets.'
Without statutory clarification, litigation will continue in this area to the extent that
the bankruptcy courts must (1) determine the designation of tax payments made in
bankruptcy, (2) apply the Energy Resources doctrine in deciding if a bankruptcy alloca-
tion of tax payments is necessary to the successful reorganization of the debtor, and (3)
determine the applicability of Energy Resources to bankruptcy proceedings other than
reorganizations.
United States v. Kare Kemical, Inc. (In re Kare Kernical, Inc.), 935 F.2d 243 (11th Cir. 1991).
ns ld. at 244.
United States v. Pepperman, 976 E2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1992).
o See In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n offTampa Bay, Inc., 128 B.R. 835 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (Chapter 11 liquidation);
In re RA. Dellastatious. Inc., 121 B.R. 487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (Chapter 7 liquidation).
"' United States v. Deer Park, Inc. (In re Deer Park. Inc.), 136 B.R. 815 (Bankr. 9th Cir 1992).
32 Id. at 818.




Langstraat and Jackson: Bankruptcy Officials
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993
AKR oN TAx JO RNAL
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND IRS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IRS v. Nordic Village-The Circuit Court
The case of IRS v. Nordic Village resulted from a transfer made by an officer and
shareholder of Nordic Village, Inc., who used the corporate funds after a Chapter 11
petition had been filed to pay his personal tax liabilities.Y The bankruptcy trustee
attempted to recover this transfer from the IRS as a voidable preference.' The IRS
claimed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as ariiculated by the Supreme Court in
Hoffman v. Connecticut Department ofIncome Maintenance,37 precluded the trustee in
bankruptcy from proceeding against the IRS.3
The Sixth Circuit found that the Hoffman case, in which it was held that the waiver
of the sovereign immunity provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to states
because of the EleventhAmendment, 9 was inapplicable to the current case dealing with
a federal agency.40 The court held that Bankruptcy Code § 106 effectively and explicitly
abolishes the defense of sovereign immunity in a claim involving a federal agency such
as the IRS and therefore, judgement was rendered against the IRS.41
United States v. Nordic Village-The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court focused on the waiver of sovereign immunity of the federal
government for monetary recoveries in bankruptcy.42 While, the Court affirmed the
Circuit Court's holding that the Hoffman case had no bearing to the case at hand, the
Court did not agree with the lower courts application of § 106.13
The Court held that waivers of the Government's sovereign immunity, to be effec-
tive, must be "unequivocally expressed" and are not to be "liberally construed." The
Court analyzed Bankruptcy Code §106(a) and (b) and found that these two sections
plainly waive sovereign immunity with regard to monetary relief in two settings: com-
pulsory counterclaims to governmental claims, and permissive counterclaims to govern-
" IRS v. Nordic Village, Inc. (InreNordic Vilage, Inc.), 915 F.2d 1049 (6thCir. 1990),cert.grantedsubnom. United
States v. Nordic village, Inc., 111 S.Q. 2823 (1991), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. l011 (1992).
31 Id. at 1050.
492 U.S. 96 (1989).
u IRSv. Nordic Village, Inc.,915 F.2d at 1051. TheIRSalsosuccessfullyargued thatthetherewas insufficientnotice
that the transfer was voidable. Id.
" Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 104.
", IRS v. Nordic Village, Inc., 915 F2d at 1053.
,1 ld. at 1052.
1 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992).
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1014 (quoting Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S: 89,95 (1990), in turn quoting United States v.
Mitchell, 455 U.S. 535,538 (1980)).
.[Vol. 10
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mental claims capped by a setofflimitation' A compulsory counterclaim occurs when
the United States' and the debtors' claims against each other arise out of the same
transaction." For example, a debtor can sue the United States under § 106(a) when the
IRS has violated the automatic stay provisions by placing a lien on bankruptcy estate
property.47
While §106(b) does not allow affirmative recovery of monetary damages, to the
extent a taxpayer has any valid claim against the United States which is property of the
debtor's estate, sovereign immunity is waived to the extent necessary to allow the setoff
of that claim against any claim asserted by the United States against the debtor.' For
example, if the debtor has-a claim against the IRS for prior year income tax refunds and
the IRS has filed a proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate for income tax liability, the
debtorcan sue the United States in orderto havethe refunds offsettheliabiity.49 If the refunds
exceeded the liability, the debtor cannot sue the government for any excess under § 106(b)5
The facts of Nordic Village did not fall under either of these provisions. Therefore,
the Court analyzed § 106(c) and developed at least two interpretations of the section,
neitherof which authorize monetary relief.1 However, the opinion states that the section
may create a waiver of govemment immunity as to requests for injunctive and declara-
tory relief.52-For example, if a levy exists on property of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor
can bring action against the governmentin orderto have the levy removed where the IRS
does not yet have possession of the levied property. This is notto say the that relief will always
be granted in such ciumstances,5 butthat the debtor can seek relief against thegovemment.
4s Id. at 1015.
S11 U.S.C.S. 106(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
4' See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
4' 11 U.S.C.S. § 106(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
49 Id.
50 Id.
31 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 1 12S.CL 1011, 1015 (1992). One interpretation was that the two paragraphs
of subsection (c) should be read as complementary rather than independent. In that case, "the second paragraph
specifies the manner in which there shall be applied to governmental units the provisions identified by the first
paragraph, i.e., a manner that permits declaratory or injunctive relief but not an affirmative monetary recovery." See
id. at 1015.
The second interpretation requires the reading of the two paragraphs of subsection (c) as being independent. In such
a reading, the phrase that introduces subsection (c) ("except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section")
would mean that the rules established in subsection (a) and (b) for waiver of Government claims are exclusive, and
preclude any resort to subsection (c). See id. at 1016.
Id. at 1015.
s See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
19931
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The Court rejected the respondent's arguments that the necessary waiver could be
found in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d)m or that a bankruptcy court's in remjurisdiction overrides
sovereign immunity.55 In a 7-2 decision, the Court found that "neither § 106(c) nor any
other provision of law establishes an unequivocal textual waiver of the Government's
immunity from abankruptcy trustee's claims for monetary relief' and therefore, re-
versed, the Circuit Court decision.16
Nordic Village establishes a standard of waiver of sovereign immunity not only for
§ 106(c), but also for § 106(a) and (b). Although the Court ruled that sovereign immunity
had not been waived in the Nordic Village case, the decision did not clearly establish a
final interpretation of § 106(c). Rather the Court determined that the statutory language
was too ambiguous as to allow for a clear and precise interpretation in favor of monetary
recovery?7 Since the Supreme Court conceded that its two interpretations of § 106(c) are
"assuredly not the only readings" of the section, it appears that, without statutory
clarification, litigation will continue in this area.
Post-Nordic Village Litigation
In a recent Chapter 13 case, the court considered an application of the Nordic Village
decision in determining whether or not the federal government had waived its sovereign
immunity under §362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.59 In, In re Pinkstaf, the Ninth Circuit
found that the IRS, by filing a notice-of federal income tax lien after the Pinkstaffs had
filed their bankruptcy petition, had waived its sovereign immunity under §106(a). °
Therefore, the court held that the debtor's were entitled to recover actual damages,
including costs and attorney fees resulting from the violation of the automatic stay.61
The court's conclusion was based, in part, ontheNordic Village opinion which states
that § 106(a) unequivocally expresses the government's consent to be sued for money
damages whenever a compulsory counterclaim is brought in response to a claim fied by
* 28 U.S.C. §1334(d) grants the district court in which a bankruptcy case is initiated "exclusive jurisdiction of all
of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate."
28U.S.C.S. § 1334(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Thecourtheldthatthe applicationofthis sectionto waive sovereign
immunity in Nordic Village would also n afoul ofthe unequivocal-expression requirement. United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 112 S. CL at 1016-17.
" United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S.CL at 1016-17. The court found that the premise for the argument of
the bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction overriding sovereign immunity was missing, since respondent did not
invoke, and the bankruptcy court did not purport to exercise, in rem jurisdiction. Id. The court held that even if in
rem jurisdiction was applicable, it has never been applied to the sovereign-immunity bar against monetary recovery.
Id. at 1017.
I d. at 1017.
ld. at 1015.
ssId. at 1016.
s' Pinkstaff v. United States (In re Pinkstaff), 974 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1992).
61 Id. at 115-16.
61 Id. at 115.
[Vol. 10
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the government6 The court also relied on its own previous opinion, In re Town &
Countr6 3 which states "[w]hen a governmental unit formally invokes the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court by filing a proof of claim, the government's exposure to coun-
terclaim liability under section 106(a) is unquestioned."
A recent bankruptcy court's use of the Nordic Village decision illustrates the differ-
entiation drawn by the Supreme Court in the application of § 106(a) and § 106(c).1 In,
In re Francis Quillard, the IRS placed levies in September of 1990 on the Quillards' IRA
accounts in two banks, Shawmut Bank and Hampden Savings Bank." Hampden Sav-
ings Bank subsequently paid over all funds in the Quillard's bank account to the IRS on
February 21, 1992 after the Quillards had filed a Chapter 7 petition on February 10,
1992.1 At the time of the court proceeding, Shawmut Bank had not paid over the levied
funds to the IRS.A The Quillard's filed an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid as
preferential transfers the two pre-petition IRS tax levies.6
The court first examined the issue of waiverof sovereign immunity, as the resolution
of such could render any other arguments of the parties moot.70 The Government argued
that Nordic Village should apply to the levies of both of the accounts because the debtors
are seeking monetary relief in a case where the Government has not waived its sovereign
immunity.71 The court analyzed each bank account separately 72
In the case of the Hampden Savings Bank in which funds were already in the
possession of the IRS, § 106(c) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Nordic Village
does not act to waive the government's sovereign immunity. The debtors were not
seeking injunctive relief in relation to the Hampden Savings funds, but rather monetary
relief?31
On the other hand, the court held that § 106(c) does apply to the Shawmut Bank
funds.' Since the funds were still at the bank and the IRS did nothave possession of such
funds, the debtors could seek release of the levy as an injunctive relief under § 106(c) as
a United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S.CL at 1015.
a Pinkstaffv. United States, 974 F.2d at 115.
" Sullivan v. Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc. (In re Town & Country), 963 E2d 1146,1150 (9th Cir.
1992).









71 Id. at 294.
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interpreted by Nordic Village 5 In its final analysis, the court held the Shawmut Bank
levy to be valid as it was filed prior to bankruptcy and that it should remain, even though
the underlying debt would be discharged in bankruptcy.76 This case clearly demonstrates
the mystifying distinction of whether the IRS has physically received the money. This
is not a viable distinction with non-federal government creditors (i.e. voidable prefer-
ences law).7 Should the result be different for the IRS?
ERISA PENSION PLANS, BANKRUPTCY AND THE IRS
Patterson v. Shumate
Prior to the 1992 decision in Patterson v. Shumate,7 there was a split among the
circuit courts of appeal as to whether or not an anti-alienation provision in an ERISA-
qualified pension plan constitutes a restriction on transferenforceable under "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" for purposes of the §541(c)(2) exclusion of property from the
debtor's bankruptcy estate. 9 Shumate filed for bankruptcy in 1984 and Chapter 7
proceedings were begun with Patterson serving as bankruptcy trustee.8 Subsequent to
Patterson's petition, the pension plan, in which Shumate was a participant, was termi-
nated and liquidated with all participants receiving full distributions except Shumate."'
Patterson filed an adversary proceeding to recover Shumate's interest in the plan for the
benefit of Shumates' bankruptcy estate.8 The plan satisfied all applicable requirements
of ERISA and qualified for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code.83 Specifically, the plan contained the anti-alienation provision required for
qualification under ERISA.84
75 Id. at 296.
76 Id. at 295.
- See 11 U.S.C.S. § 547 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1993).
- 112 S. CL 2242 (1992).
79 Compare Gladwell v. Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. CL 2991 (1992);
Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991); Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied
subnon. Forbes v. Holiday Corp. Sav. & Retrement Plan, 1l lS. CL 2275 (1991)andAnderson v. Raine (In reMoore),
907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990) with Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991); Daniel v. Security
Pac. Nat. Bank (in re Daniel),771 F.2d 1352 (9thCir. 1985), cert.denied, 475 U.S. 1016(1986); Lichstrahlv. Bankers
Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 E2d 1268 (8th Cir.
1984); and Goff v. Taylor(n re Goff), 706 E2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983)1
10 Patterson v. Shumate, 112S. CL at 2245.
*~Id.
Id.
" See IR.C. §§ 401-409 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
u See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
[Vol. 10
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The district court held that §541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states "A
restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title,"5 referred
to state law only and not federal law such as ERISA.6 The court applied the state law
and held that Shumate's interest in the plan did not qualify for protection as a spendthrift
trust." This analysis and conclusion was consistent with several circuit court opinions.'
The Fourth Circuit then reversed.89
The Supreme Court used the Patterson case to resolve the conflict among the circuit
courts. The Court upheld the Fourth Circuit's opinion by finding that the term "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law'" must be read to include both federal as well as state law.91
The Court was confident that Congress, when it desired to do so, knew how to restrict
the scope of applicable law to "state law." 2 The Court concluded that this holding gives
full and appropriate effect to ERISA's goal of protecting pension benefits and cited a
prior Supreme Court case:
Section 206(d) [ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)] reflects a considered con-
gressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for
pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually ae,
blameless), even ifthat decision prevents others from securing relief for the
wrongs done them.93
In re Michael Duawayne Jacobs, Sr.
Subsequent to the Patterson decision, the Bankruptcy Court of the Western District
of Pennsylvania heard a similar case with slightly different facts.94 The IRS filed a tax
lien against Jacobs on May 2, 1991 for tax liabilities related to 1985 and 1986.9 On
September 17, 1991, Jacobs fied for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.96 The dispute in question
was whether the IRS lien was valid.97 If found not valid, the tax liabilities would be
discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding and the IRS would not be paid.9
u See 11 U.S.C.S. § 541(c)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.C, at 2245.
7 Id.
u See supra note 79.
Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. at 2245.
- See 11 U.S.C.S. §541(c)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
91 Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.C, at 2248.
92 Id. at 2246.
" Id. at 2250 (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)).
" See Jacobs v. IRS (In re Jacobs), 147 B.R. 106 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
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The court stated from the outset that the debtor agreed that the pension plan should
be included in his estate, which, based on the facts given, seems odd in light of the
Patterson decision.9 The debtor argued that the non-alienation provision of I.R.C.
§401 (a)(13), whichessentially provides forthe samenon-alienationprovision as §206(d)(1)
of ERISA, should preclude the IRS's lien from attaching to his pension fund.100
In contrast to the Patterson decision, neither the debtor nor the court, raised the
connection drawn in Patterson between Bankruptcy Code §541(c)(2)'s exclusion and
the non-alienation provisions. Rather, the court analyzed I.R.C. §6334(a) which pro-
vides exemption from IRS levy for specified items and concluded that the debtor's
pension plan was not accorded exemption by this section.10' The debtor did raise the
applicability of Patterson, but the court distinguished the Supreme Court case in that it
did not involve the Internal Revenue Code. The court stated: "the conclusion there
[Pattersonv. Shumate], that the bankruptcy trustee cannot get access to a debtor's ERISA
qualified pension plan, does not have a significant bearing on the rights of the IRS to
reach the same assets under the Internal Revenue Code."''1 2 The court concluded that the
IRS had a valid lien on all of the Debtor's assets including the pension plan.1°
If the Jacobs decision can be upheld in a higher court, it seems that Patterson and
Jacobs together establish that in a bankruptcy situation, an ERISA-qualified pension
plan may be subject to collection by the IRS where it cannot be reached by any other
creditor. Although, the bankruptcy court did not address the issue, a valid question is
whether the ERISA plan would have been subject to IRS collection in bankruptcy had
there been no pre-petition lien. Based on Patterson, the answer would be no and based
on the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the IRS would be barred from
administering a levy post-petition.104 If, as these cases suggest, the IRS can access a
debtor's ERISA-qualified pension plan through a pre-petition levy, but not otherwise,
this is difficult to reconcile with the ERISA goal of safeguarding a stream of income for
pensioners or with the Bankruptcy Code.policy of "fresh start." Without statutory
clarification, this area is one which will surely see future litigation between the IRS and
bankrupt debtors.
PRIORITY OF IRS CLAIMS: EXCISE TAX VS. PENALTY
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the priority of pre-petition tax claims, including
excise taxes, in bankruptcy. 10 A common dispute which arises between bankruptcy
9 Id.
1w Id.
101 Id. at 108.
1wa Id. at 109.
Im d.
104 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 362(aX4) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
See 11 U.S.C.S. § 5W(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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officials and the IRS is whether or not a particular "excise tax," as labeled by Congress,
is actually an excise tax to be granted priority status or a penalty related to a pecuniary
loss which would constitute a subordinated claim. 106
In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the priority to be accorded federal pension
excise tax claims under the Bankruptcy Code.'° After Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. had
filed petition for relief under chapter 11, the IRS filed proof of claim for the debtor's
pension excise tax liability under I.R.C. §497l(a). 0 As the court's analysis indicates,
§4971 islocatedinSubtitleDoftheLRC. undertheheading"M iselaousExciseTaxes. ' 19
Specifically, §4971(a) imposes a yearly tax of 10% on the amount of the accumu-
lated funding deficiency under a pension plan.110 The court rejected the bankruptcy
trustee's argument that the assessments under §4971(a) are actually penalties disguised
as taxes and held that since Congress labeled the assessments under §4971 excise taxes
and since such law was in existence when the Bankruptcy Code drafters used the term
excise in §507, it was not up to the court's discretion to redefine the nature of the
assessment.111 "Congress at the very least meant to include those exactions which
Congress itself had previously deemed to be federal excise taxes."'12
In re: C-T of Virginia, Inc.
In a similar case, the Fourth Circuit determined that a tax imposed under I.R.C.
§4980 (10% of the assets of a qualified pension plan in the event the assets of the plan
revert to the employerupon the plan's termination) is a monetary imposition in the nature
of an excise tax and subject to priority treatment in bankruptcy.13
However, unlike the Sixth Circuit inMansfield, the Fourth Circuit did use its author-
ity to determine the purpose of the tax, rather than letting the name of the tax control.""
The court cited its own prior decision in In re Kline, which held: "An enactment which
has is its purpose the punishment of conduct perceived as wrongful should be deemed
See 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 507(a)(7)(G), 726 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
10 See United States v. Mansfield Tire& Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire& Rubber Co.), 942 F2d 1055 (6th Cr.
1991), cert. denied, 112S. CL 1165 (1992).
,m Id. at 1056.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1057.
"I Id. at 1059.
112 Id.
"' United States v. Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of C-T of Va., Inc. (In re C-T of Va., Inc.), 977 F.2d 137 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.CL 1644 (1993).
"Id Id. at 139.
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a "penalty"... regardless of the terminology employed by the legislature." ' s The court
affirmed the lower court's holding thatjust because atax is intended to discourage certain
conduct, similar to a penalty, it is not prevented from being an excise tax entitled to
priority treatment in bankruptcy.116
United States v. Dwnler
The Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected Mansfield, and determined that the exaction
under I.R.C. §72(t) is a "penalty" for purposes of determining priority in bankruptcy."7
Unlike the "excise tax" in Mansfield, the §72(t) tax is labeled "additional tax" under the
Internal Revenue Code.18 The court used its authority to determine whether the addi-
tional tax was actually a disguised penalty and relied on a Supreme Court case not cited
by the Sixth Circuit in Mansfield. In that case, the court was required to determine
whether an exaction under Title VIII of the Social Security Act constituted a debtor a
tax for purposes of priority in bankruptcy: "atax.... includes any 'pecuniary burden laid
upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the Government,' by what-
ever name it may be called.""9 The court concluded that the "penalty" under I.R.C.
§72(t), which provides for a 10% assessment on individuals for early pension plan
withdrawal, is punitive in nature, and not entitled to priority under §507 of the
Bankruptcy Code.' °
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion above delineates four major areas of conflict between
bankruptcy officials/debtors and the IRS. Other areas of conflict abound.'2' These
conflicts have resulted in wasted resources on the part of the bankrupt estates and the
federal government Congress and the executive branch have control over the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code. As such, action should be takento eliminate
these areas of conflict and the resulting waste of resources.
I15 d. (quoting United States v. Feinblakt (In re Kline), 403 F Supp. 974,978 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 823
(4th Cir. 1977). Note that In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. specifically rejects the decision in In re Kline. In re
Mansfield Tiwe & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d at 1060.
m In re C-Tof Va., Inc.. 977 F.2d at 140, aff'd 135 B.R. 501 (W.D. Va. 1991).
"7 United States v. Dumler(In re Cassidy), 983 F. 2d 161 (10th Cir. 1992).
n See I.R.C. § 72(t) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
n" In re Cassidy, 983 P.2d at 163 (quoting United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510,515 (1942),in turn quoting New
Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906)) (emphasis added).
IM d. at 164.
' See Langstraat and Aquadro, supra note 3.
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Based on the forgoing analysis, the following specific statutory amendments
are suggested:
1. The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to specifically allow
the trustee to allocate tax payments between trust fund and non-
trust fundtaxes whenitisnecessary forthe successofthe"feshstart"
of the debtor, regardless of the type of bankruptcy proceeding?2
2. The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to explicitly provide
that the government's sovereign immunity is completely waived
in bankruptcy situations. This will ensure that the policies of
"fresh start" and the equal treatment of all creditors under long-
approved priorities will be respected.123
3. The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to specifically exclude
ERISA-qualified pension plans from the bankruptcy estate and to
preclude the use of ERISA-qualified pension plans to resolve debts
of the bankrupt debtor including those under liens of the IRS.'
4. The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to specifically list
excise taxes which ae allowed priority treatment in bankruptcy
(i.e. all listed in I.R.C. Subtitle D). '1
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service litigation policies should be changed to
discourage bankruptcy litigation which conflicts with the underlying policies of the
Bankruptcy Code. Likewise, trustees in bankruptcy should be instructed to allow,
without confrontation, IRS collection actions which do not jeopardize the policy-based
protections for the bankrupt estate.'1
The policy behind the Internal Revenue Code is to promote maximum assessment
and collection of taxes. The policy behind the Bankruptcy Code is to provide debtors
with a "fresh start" In attempting to protect these goals, both the IRS and bankruptcy
officials have managed to waste precious resources, resulting in a partial loss of effec-
tiveness for both policies. Hopefully, Congress will take action in the near future to
resolve these conflicts and allow both sides to attain their goals in the most efficient manner.
m See IRS v. Energy Resources Co., Inc. (In re Energy Resources Co., Inc.), 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989)1, cert.
grantedsubnoa. United States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., 493 U.S. 963 (1989), aff'd, 495 U.S. 545 (1990); see
also United States v. Deer Park, Inc. (In re Deer Park, Inc.), 136 B.R. 815 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992).
' See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992).
Im See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 2242 (1992); see also Jacobs v. IRS (In reJacobs), 147 B.R. 106 (Bankr.W.D.
Pa. 1992).
W See United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.) 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1165 (1992).
0 See Langstraat and Aquadro, supra note 3.
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